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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Yeoman entered a conditional plea of guilty to failure to register as a sex 
offender and reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
dismiss. On appeal, Mr. Yeoman contends that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss his charge of failing to register as a sex offender. Specifically, 
I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(c), the subsection of the sex offender registration statute applicable to 
individuals from a foreign state who have been convicted of any crime substantially 
equivalent to those listed in subsection (l)(a), should be read to incorporate the 
temporal limitation of subsection (l)(a), thereby requiring that the out of state 
convictions occur prior July 1, 1993. As a result, Mr. Yeoman does not have to register 
as a sex offender in ldaho because he was convicted of rape in 1984 in Washington 
and was not on probation or parole as of July I ,  1993. 
Alternatively, Mr. Yeoman contends that I.C. § 18-8304 is unconstitutional as it 
treats new residents of ldaho differently than other residents of Idaho. Mr. Yeoman 
asserts that the disparate treatment of out-of-state sex offenders, as compared to their 
in-state counterparts, as required by I.C. 5 18-8304, violates his rights under the United 
States Constitution, and the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Sfafe v. 
Dickerson, 142 ldaho 514,517,129 P.3d 1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 13, 2008, Richard Yeoman was charged by lnformation with failure to 
register as a sex offender. (R., pp.24-25.) In 1984, Mr. Yeoman was convicted of rape 
in Washington State. (R., p.26; (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 
p.3.) For purposes of the current appeal, it is undisputed that Mr. Yeoman was not on 
probation or parole on July 1, 1993, and was required to register as a sex offender in 
Washington as ofthe date he was arrested for the instant offense. (R., pp.12, 26-27.) It 
was the State's position that Mr. Yeoman's 1984 rape conviction was substantially 
equivalent to those offenses listed in I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(a) and because Mr. Yeoman was 
required to register in Washington, he was required to register upon moving into Idaho. 
(R., pp.6-14, 24-25, 36-41 .) 
On March 24, 2008, defense counsel for Mr. Yeoman filed a Motion to Dismiss 
lnformation wherein he argued first that I.C. 3 18-8304(1)(c) which requires a party to 
register if that party had previously been convicted of an offense that is "substantially 
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a)," requires that the previous 
conviction from the foreign jurisdiction occur on or after July 1, 1993. (R., pp.31-33.) 
Alternatively, if the temporal limitations of I.C. 318-8304(1)(a) are not incorporated into 
(l)(c), I.C. §18-8304(1)(c) is unconstitutional as it burdens Mr. Yeoman's fundamental 
right to travel in violation of Article IV, Cj 2 of the United States Constitution and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (R., pp.26-33.) The 
State filed a written response and Mr. Yeoman provided supplemental authority. 
(R., pp.36-41, 4341 .) 
Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court entered an Order 
Denying Motion to Dismiss Information. (R., p.47.) In denying Mr. Yeoman's motion, 
the district court applied the rational basis standard, rather than strict scrutiny. 
(Tr., p.-l2, Ls.3-12.) The district court concluded that there was a legitimate interest "to 
not create a situation where ldaho essentially could become a haven for persons who 
must register in the state from which they come from, urging them to move here, so they 
would not have to register in the State of ldaho." (Tr., p.12, Ls.9-21.) 
Mr. Yeoman then entered into a conditional plea of guilty to failure to register as 
a sex offender, preserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
dismiss. (R., pp.58-60, 64-66.) The district imposed a unified sentence of five years, 
with three years fixed, upon Mr. Yeoman's plea of guilty to failure to register as a sex 
offender. (R., pp.87-89.) Mr. Yeoman filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district 
court's judgment and sentence. (R., pp.90-92.) 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Yeoman's Motion to Dismiss Information? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denving Mr. Yeoman's Motion To Dismiss Information 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Yeoman was previously convicted of rape in the State of Washington in 
1984. As of July I ,  1993, Mr. Yeoman was not on probation or parole for his previous 
conviction, but was required to register as a sex offender in the State of Washington. 
Mr. Yeoman asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss as he 
was convicted of a crime prior to July 1, 1993, and was not on probation or parole as of 
July 1, 1993, and pursuant to I.C. 3 18-8304(l)(a),(c) Mr. Yeoman is not required to 
register as a sex offender in the State of ldaho.' Alternatively, if this Court does not find 
that I.C. § 18-8304(1)(c) incorporates the temporal limitations of (l)(a), then the 
disparate treatment created by I.C. 3 18-8304, which treats an in-state sex offender 
differently than a similarly situated out-of-state sex offender, burdens the fundamental 
right to travel and "establish a home." Because I.C. 3 18-8304 imposes a restriction on 
a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny review, and the legislation violates the 
Equal Protection Clause unless the State meets its burden to show a compelling 
government interest for the disparate treatment. 
' Mr. Yeoman acknowledges that this issue was previously litigated and disposed of in 
State v. Dickerson, 142 ldaho 514, 517, 129 P.3d 1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 2006). 
However, Mr. Yeoman expressly preserved this issue in his conditional plea of guilty 
and as Mr. Yeoman acknowledges in the district court, the ldaho Supreme Court has 
not rendered an opinion on the construction of I.C. 348-8304 as of the completion of this 
brief. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Yeoman's Motion To Dismiss Information 
Because ldaho Code Section 18-8304 Does Not Reauire Individuals With Pre- 
1993 Convictions And Are Not On Probation Or Parole As Of July I. 1993. To 
Re~ister As A Sex Offender 
1. Pursuant To The Plain Language Of I.C. 5 18-8403, Mr. Yeoman Is Not 
Required To Reqister As A Sex Offender In ldaho 
Mr. Yeoman asserts that he has no duty to register as a sex offender for his 1984 
rape conviction from Washington under the plain language contained in ldaho Code 
section 18-8304. The standards applicable to the construction of criminal statutes are 
well established: 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is 
no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory 
interpretation. When the court must engage in statutory construction, it 
has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. 
To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of 
the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public 
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon 
the court to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. 
Where ambiguity exists as to the elements of a crime, this Court will 
strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant, 
State v. Beard, 135 ldaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (2001) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). Thus, a court facing a question of interpretation of a criminal 
statute must first determine if the statute is plain and unambiguous. 
The individuals required to register as sex offenders are set out in I.C. § 18-8304, 
which provides, in relevant portion: 
( I )  The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who: 
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a 
solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18- 
909 (assault with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, 
or lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding mayhem, 
murder or robbery), 18-91 1 (battery with attempt to commit rape, infamous 
crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, but 
excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child 
under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18- 
1507 (sexual exploitation of a child), 18-1507A (possession of sexually 
exploitative material for other than a commercial purpose), 18-1508 (lewd 
conduct with a minor child), 18-1508A (sexual battery of a minor child 
sixteen or seventeen years of age), 18-1509A (enticing a child over the 
internet), 18-4003(d) (murder committed in perpetration of rape), 18-4116 
(indecent exposure, but excluding a misdemeanor conviction), 18-4502 
(first degree kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape, committing the 
infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and lascivious 
act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for purposes of sexual 
gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping where the 
victim is an unrelated minor child), 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18- 
6101(1) where the defendant is eighteen years of age or younger), 18- 
61 08 (male rape), 18-6602 (incest), 18-6605 (crime against nature), 18- 
6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object), or upon a 
second or subsequent conviction under 18-6609, ldaho Code (video 
voyeurism); 
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a 
conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or 
other jurisdiction of the United States, including tribal courts and military 
courts, that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in 
subsection (l)(a) of this section and was required to register as a sex 
offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established 
permanent or temporary residency in ldaho. 
ldaho Code §18-8304(1)(a), (c). 
In the instant case, it is the State's position that Mr. Yeoman is required to 
register as a sex offender in ldaho because he was convicted of an offense that is 
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section" and as 
a result of that conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender in Washington. 
Mr. Yeoman asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
because under the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute, an offense which is 
substantially equivalent to "to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a)" can only be an 
offense committed on or before July 1, 1993.' 
Subsection (l)(c) is the only section that involved foreign convictions. I.C. § 18- 
8304. A person was only required to register in ldaho if the out-of-state conviction was 
"substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a)". I.C. § 18-8304. 
Because subsection (l)(a) clearly limited each offense listed as those offenses 
committed after July 1, 1993, only foreign convictions after July I ,  1993, would be 
substantially equivalent. Therefore, only individuals with foreign convictions with an 
offense identified in subsection (l)(a) that occurred after July 1, 1993, must register in 
the State of ldaho. 
Mr. Yeoman's conviction is not substantially equivalent to the offenses outlined in 
ldaho Code section 18-8304 because his offense occurred in 1984, nine years prior to 
any ldaho requirement to register. Mr. Yeoman had no duty to register upon moving 
into ldaho, and therefore the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
2. Alternatively, If This Court Finds I.C. 5 18-8304 To Be Ambiauous, Under 
The Rule Of Lenity, I.C. S18-8304(1)(c) Must Be Read To Include The 
Temporal Limitation That The Defendant Was Convicted, Or Still Serving 
His Sentence, On Or Before July 1. 1993 
Mr. Yeoman asserts that if this Court finds I.C. § 18-8304 to be ambiguous, it 
must find, pursuant to the rule of lenity, that a substantially related offense as articulated 
in I.C. § 18-8304(1)(c) must incorporate the temporal limitation of section (l)(a). The 
Or where the defendant was on probation or parole on or after July 1, 1993. See 
I.C. 5 18-8304(l)(d). 
United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous 
statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002. 
The Crandon Court noted the importance of not deciding a case based upon 
interpreting a statute using the "possible" legislative intent or policies the legislature 
might have had in mind at the time it authored the statute. The district court noted that 
Idaho did not provide any clear guidance of the definition of "same offense" or how the 
felony exception should be applied. (R., p.41.) Criminal statutes are promulgated on 
the premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law. The 
general public cannot be on notice of what might have been the legislature's intent or 
policy behind drafting a statute. 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas further spoke to this premise in a 
concurring opinion in United States v. R.I.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). They concluded 
"that it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal 
statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is 
determined that the statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient 
interpretation prevail." Id. at 293 (Scalia concurring). The Justices further stated that 
the consideration of legislative history "compromises the purposes of the lenity rule: to 
assure that the criminal statutes provide a fair warning of what conduct is considered 
illegal." Id. In the interest of justice, absent a clear statement from the ldaho 
Legislature, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the 
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. 
Applying the rule of lenity, because Mr. Yeoman was not convicted on or after 
July I ,  1993, and was not on probation or parole on or after July I, 1993, he does not 
have to register as a sex offender in Idaho. Accordingly, the district court erred in 
denying Mr. Yeoman's motion to dismiss. 
C. Alternatively, If This Court Finds That I.C. 6 18-8304(1)(3) Does Not Incorporate 
The Temporal Limitations Of Section (l)(a), I.C. 18-8304(1)(c) Is 
Unconstitutional As It Treats Interstate Travelers Who Would Like To Become 
Permanent Residents Of The State Of ldaho Differentlv Than Other Citizens Of 
The State Of Idaho, In Violation Of The Equal Protection Clause Of The 
Fourteenth Amendment 
1. Idaho Code 5 18-83.04(1)(c) Violates Mr. Yeoman's Fundamental Riaht 
To Travel And Is Subiect To Strict Scrutiny 
"If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will 
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relationship to some 
legitimate end." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). Here, it is Mr. Yeoman's 
contention that ldaho Code section 18-8304 burdens his fundamental right to travel 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is 
therefore, subject to strict scrutiny review by this court. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 US. 
In Saenz, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The "right to travel" discussed in our cases embraces at least three 
different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter 
and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor 
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent 
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. 
Id. at 500 (emphasis added). The "right to travel is derived from Article IV, 3 2 of the 
United States constitution3 as well as the additional protection the Privileges and 
lmmunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides." Id. at 500-503. The right 
of a newly arrived citizen to a state to receive the same privileges and immunities 
enjoyed by other citizens of that state is derived not only from his or her status as a 
state citizen, but also by his or her status as a citizen of the United States. Id. at 502. 
The additional protection of the Fourteen Amendment is clearly identified in section I, 
which states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
U.S. Const., amend. XIV, 5 1 
The U.S. Supreme Court has always held that the aforementioned clause 
protects those travelers right to be treated like other residents of a State when they 
travel to that State. Id. at 503. Thus, "a citizen of the United States can, of his own 
volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bon.2 fide residence therein, 
with the same rights as other citizens of that State," and "is not bound to cringe to any 
superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens." Id. (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, I 6  U.S. (1 
Wall.) 36, 80; 112-113 (1872)). The right to travel is a fundamental right. Shapiro v. 
Article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitutions provides that "The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States." 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-630 (1969). Thus, a violation of a citizen's fundamental 
right to travel and receive all the privileges and immunities of the new state is subject to 
a strict scrutiny analysis, and the burden is on the State to establish why it is 
permissible to discriminate by applying varying rules against a particular class. Saenz, 
526 U.S. at 503, 505. The State may not impose restriction on the fundamental right to 
travel without demonstrating a compelling governmental interest in curtailing it. Shapiro, 
394 U.S. at 634 (striking down state imposed one year residency requirement as a 
prerequisite to receiving welfare benefits); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 
(1972) (striking down state law which conditioned the right to vote in state elections on a 
one year residency requirement); ll/Iemorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 405 U.S. 330 
(1974) (holding that a one year county residency requirement which was a prerequisite 
for entitlement to nonemergency hospitalization or emergency care was 
unconstitutional). 
Here, ldaho Code section 18-8304 requires those ldaho residents, who 
committed an offense articulated in ldaho Code section 18-8304(4)(a) (hereinafter, Sex 
Offense) in the State of ldaho on or after July 1, 1993, or were incarcerated, or under 
the supervision of probation or parole for one of the articulated "sex offenses" on or after 
July 1, 1993, to register as a sex offender. I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a), (l)(d). 
Thus, those ldaho residents committing any Sex Offense and completing 
probation on said offense prior to July 1, 1993, would not have to register as a sex 
offender and would not be subject to any violation for failing to register. However, any 
individual moving to ldaho, who committed an offense "substantially equivalent to the 
crimes listed in" ldaho Code section 18-8304(1)(a) prior to July 1, 1993, and finished 
probation on said offense prior to July 1, 1993, would still have to register as a sex 
offender. I.C. 5 18-8304(1)(c). Thus, the statute in question clearly treats an in-state 
sex offender differently than it would a similarly situated out-of-state sex offender. 
It is Mr. Yeoman's claim that ldaho Code section 18-8304, which requires him to 
register as a sex offender, when a similarly situated ldaho resident would not have to, 
infringed upon his fundamental right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and resulted in a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws, pursuant to 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the disparate 
treatment between out-of-state sex offenders and in-state sex offenders created by 
ldaho Code section 18-8304, violates Mr. Yeoman fundamental right to travel and is 
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. The State has set forth no compelling governmental 
reason for the disparate treatment. The district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Yeoman's motion to dismiss. 
2. Alternativelv, If This Court Were To Find That ldaho Code Section 18- 
8304 Does Not Burden Mr. Yeoman's Fundamental Riqht To Travel, He 
Asserts That ldaho Code Section 18-8304 Violates His Riaht To Equal 
Protection Under A Rational Review Standard 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
U.S. Const. amend XIV, 3 1. "The clause does not require that all persons be treated 
alike, but rather that 'all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."' Doe v. 
McVey, 381 F.Supp.2d 443, 449 (E.D.Pa. 2005) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). If this Court finds that ldaho Code section 18- 
8304 does not infringe upon a fundamental right then the disparate treatment caused by 
Idaho Code section 18-8304, must bear a rational basis to some legitimate purpose. 
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996). 
The United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided a 
case which is directly on point with the issue raised in Mr. Yeoman's case. See Doe, 
381 F.Supp.2d 443 (E.D.Pa. 2005). In Doe, the defendant, Doe, was convicted of a sex 
offense in New Jersey, but serving his probation in Pennsylvania. Id. at 443. Doe 
brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging Pennsylvania's 
Registration of Sex Offender's Act, Megan's Law. Id. at 444. Doe challenged the 
subsequent amended version of Megan's Law, which mandated that all out-of-state 
individuals convicted of a sex offense be subject to community notification, even though 
an in-state individual convicted of the same offense in Pennsylvania "would only be 
subject to community notification if, after a civil hearing, he had been designated as a 
'sexual violent predator...."' Id. at 444-45. The Doe Court found that the disparate 
treatment between in-state and out-of-state sex offenders violated the Eclual Protection 
Clause. Id. at 444. In reaching its decision, the Court found that: 
Had Doe been convicted of this crime in Pennsylvania, he would have 
been required to register with the state police and would have received a 
civil hearing ... to determine whether, under Pennsylvania's Megan's Law, 
he was a 'sexual violent predator' for whom community notification was 
warranted. . . . However, because he is an out-of-state offender, Doe was 
not accorded such a hearing. Instead, without a determination that he 
was a 'sexually violent predator,' Doe was advised that he would be 
required to submit to community notification. 
The Court, analyzing the issue under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, found a constitutional violation. Id. at 449-50. It should be 
noted that the Doe Court did not address the issue under the "right to travel" analysis 
because at the time Doe moved to Pennsylvania he was still on probation and may 
have had a reduced right to travel. Compare Lines v. Wargo, 271 F.Supp.2d 649 
(W.D.Pa. 2003) (Plaintiff had a "revived" right to travel by virtue of his approved 
transfer.) with Pelland v. Rhode Island, 317 F.Supp. 86 (D.R.I. 2004) (probationer has 
no right to travel.) However, as further addressed below, the statute complained of in 
Doe could not even meet the rational basis test. 
In addressing the violation under the Equal Protection Clause, the Doe Court 
held that because Doe's status as a sex offender does not fall within a suspect class, 
the State had to prove the statute "bears a rational relationship to some legitimate end." 
Doe, 381 F.Supp.2d at 450. In holding that the State did not meet its burden, the Court 
rejected the governmental objectives alleged by the State to justify the disparate 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state sex offenders. Id. at 450-51. 
The Court held that the additional expense in providing the hearing to the out-of- 
state offender to determine whether the offender is a "sexual violent predator" is not 
legitimate. Id. at 450 (citing to Saenz, supra.) Next, the State argued that Pennsylvania 
would become a haven for sex offenders, which the Court held did not justify the 
disparate treatment. Id. Finally, the State argued that "subjecting out-of-state offenders 
to community notification is necessary to promote public safety ...." Id. In response to 
the State's final argument, the Court stated, "any concern over the public's lack of 
knowledge about out-of-state offenders applies with equal force to in-state offenders 
and, therefore, cannot justify Pennsylvania's disparate treatment of the two groups." Id. 
at 451. Accordingly, the Court held that Megan's Law violated Doe's rights under the 
equal protection clause and the State failed to show a legitimate basis for the disparate 
treatment. Id. at 450-51. In reaching its decision, the Court, noted: 
Because this court finds that the disparity between in-state and out-of- 
state offenders codified in Pennsylvania's Megan's Law does not survive 
rational basis review, it is not necessary to consider whether, as a 
probationer, Doe retains a fundamental right to travel that would trigger 
heightened scrutiny. 
Id. at 451, n. 10 (citing to Saenz, supra). 
In fact, more recently, in Sfafe v. Dickerson, 142 ldaho 514, 517, 129 P.3d 1263, 
1266 (Ct. App. 2006), the ldaho Court of Appeals found the former version of Idaho's 
sex offender registration statute to be unconstitutional. Id. The Dickerson Court 
recognized that the statute "created a disparity between sex offenders who moved to 
ldaho after mid-1993 and offenders who were longer-term residents." Id. at 518, 129 
P.3d at 1267. The Court noted that the statute penalized persons with pre-1993 
convictions who moved to the state after 1993 by requiring registration when it is not 
required of like offenders who are longer-term residents. Id. The ldaho Court of 
Appeals went on to state that the "legislative history suggests that the discrimination 
against new arrivals with pre-1993 foreign conviction in the former law was not a 
purposeful pursuit of any state interest or policy but was recognized as an error and 
possibly an unconstitutional classification." Id. at 521-22, 129 P.3d at 1270-71. The 
statute requiring offenders with pre-1993 convictions from other states who move to 
ldaho requiring registration, but not requiring registration from offenders with like 
convictions residing in ldaho was held unconstitutional. Id. at 522, 129, P.3d at 1271. 
In reaching its decision, the Dickerson Court did not decide whether strict 
scrutiny would be appropriate, but instead, held that even under the lesser standard of 
the rational basis test, the State would not be able to meet a legitimate state interest for 
the disparate treatment. Id. at 521-522, 129 P.3d at 1270-1271 
Here, it is undisputed below that Mr. Yeoman was not on probation at the time of 
his arrest. Accordingly, as found in Dickerson, Lines and Doe, supra, Mr. Yeoman 
asserts that the disparate treatment between similarly situated in-state sex offenders 
and out-of-state sex offenders, as mandated by Idaho Code section 18-8304, violates 
his rights the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. As such, the district court erred in 
denying Mr. Yeoman's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Yeoman respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2009. 
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